Bittensor is a decentralized AI network. TAO holders govern the protocol via a bicameral senate system and BIT improvement proposals.
Subnets need a more flexible way to manage resources the chain allows them to use - they are currently constrained unnecessarily and it limits their potential, requiring cumbersome workarounds, dragging down the progress of decentralized AI in Bittensor ecosystem. I propose that limits are unified into SUBNET GAS so that it can be spent more flexibly.
Abstract Based on our statistics, the current miner's emission burning situation as follows: 42 Subnets: No burning. 3 Subnets: Miner's emission burning ratio between 10% and 30%. 5 Subnets: Miner's emission burning ratio between 40% and 50%. 6 Subnets: Miner's emission burning ratio between 60% and 70%. 9 Subnets: Miner's emission burning ratio between 70% and 80%. 1 Subnets: Miner's emission burning ratio between 80% and 90%. 4 ...
Some smart contracts, such as collateral and treasury, need a way to count votes of validators in order to make a decision for the subnet. The only metrics currently available are: - current stake - stakeweight (stake snapshot saved at the last epoch) and both can be manipulated with loans and flashloans, where an attacker could hijack the treasury or burn collaterals of his competitors. The proposed solution is for the chain to provide a reliable metric that the votes could be weighted by....
This BIT proposes synchronizing all subnet ALPHA emissions to the global TAO halving schedule, replacing per-subnet ALPHA halvings that introduce timing-driven cohort bias in Dynamic TAO. Under synchronization, ALPHA-halving intervals stop compressing (getting shorter), liquidity impact depends on sell fraction rather than cohort timing, liquidation haircuts disappear, and the root proportion declines uniformly, resulting in fairer and more predictable behavior across cohorts.
BIT-0019: Substrate Smart Contracts - BIT Number: 0019 - Title: Substrate Smart Contracts - Author(s): Ben Mason, Francisco Silva - Status: Draft - Type: Core - Created: 24/09/2025 ## Abstract This BIT proposes the integration of Substrate's pallet_contracts into the Bittensor blockchain, enabling smart contracts written in Rust using the ink! language. This native Substrate smart contract functionality will provide seamless interaction between smart contracts a...
The current Bittensor subnet ownership model creates significant limitations by registering ownership to a single on-chain entity. It offers no native mechanism to distribute ownership rights or rewards, hindering collaborative governance and investor participation. This PR introduces Distributed Subnet Ownership, a protocol-level solution that allows both economic and governance rights to be fractionalized into on-chain shares. This enables multiple stakeholders to co-own and manage a subne...
Current issues: - large burn price fluctuations - long periods where nobody can register Proposed fixes: - price changes every block not every interval - remove all rate limits from registration
Summary BIT-0016 proposes reenabling and improving subnet deregistration to remove non-functional subnets that waste emissions, chain storage, and compute resources. Deregistration would be based on on-chain metrics such as lack of demand for the subnet’s Alpha token, low price and emissions, centralized miner distribution, and poor liquidity/volume parameters. A new SubnetLimit (default 128/256) would trigger automatic pruning by removing the lowest-emission subnet outside its immunity...
Summary This BIT introduces subnet owner emission splitting, allowing subnet owners to automatically distribute their alpha emissions among multiple sub-owners using proportional shares. Building on the proven childkey delegation system, it enables collaborative development models, multi-party ownership structures, and separation of ownership control from reward distribution. The proposal maintains full backwards compatibility with existing subnets while adding new storage and extrinsic...
This BIT proposes introduction of stake locks, where lock conviction will determine subnet ownership. Note: In fact it tables the https://github.com/opentensor/subtensor/pull/1860.
🔍 Abstract This BIT proposes burning alpha and root TAO for subnet owner and all subnet validators proportionally to alpha burned in burn keys (all hotkeys associated with owner's coldkey). Note: This BIT in fact tables the PR #1883.
This BIT proposes introduction of stake locks, where lock conviction will determine subnet ownership. Note: In fact it tables the PR #1860.
This BIT proposes introduction of stake locks, where lock conviction will determine subnet ownership. Note: In fact it tables the (PR #1860)[https://github.com/opentensor/subtensor/pull/1860].
This BIT proposes extending the current BIT lifecycle with additional stages and type-specific pathways. The current lifecycle lacks important stages and treats all proposal types uniformly, which may lead to ambiguity and inefficient processing of different BIT types.
This BIT proposes allowing subnet owners to reduce the maximum number of UIDs on their subnet below the current fixed limit of 256. Subnet owners would be able to set their maximum UIDs down to a minimum threshold of 64, with changes taking effect immediately and excess UIDs being deregistered based on lowest emissions first. This BIT as any other possible BITs in the future should be archived for documentation purposes.
This BIT proposes changing the subnet owner UID implementation from a "burn UID" to a "recycle UID". Currently, mining incentives allocated to the subnet owner hotkey are burned by being skipped during distribution while still being counted in emission totals. This proposal would instead recycle these incentives by reducing the SubnetAlphaOut variable, making the ALPHA available for future distribution similar to how TAO was recycled pre-DTAO.
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As a component of the broader Proof of Weights initiative (#10), a mechanism is required to verify that validator weights submitted to the blockchain are valid per a subnet-owner-controlled verification contract. This BIT proposes a mechanism to enable subnet owners to deploy custom verification contracts that validate weight submissions before they affect consensus. The proposed optimistic verification mechanism maintains network security while minimizing on-chain computational overhead. <i...
Subsubnet Support: Multi-Weight Spaces per Subnet This PR introduces subsubnets, a new abstraction layer within subnets that enables multiple independent weight spaces, incentive flows, and emission configurations within the same subnet. Each subnet can define up to 8 subsubnets (IDs 0–7), allowing complex multi-task validation while maintaining validator cohesion. Key Features: - Per-subsubnet weight setting, commitment, and emission logic - Fully backward-compatible with legacy miners...
Bittensor needs an (un)official and (un)endorsed ERC-20 compatible wTAO contract for use across all applications built within the Bittensor EVM. By design, the EVM does not allow an EOA (Externally Owned Account) to grant another address direct access to their native token balance. This is often handled on other networks by creating an ERC-20 compatible wrapper contract for the native token. This proposal outlines why an (un)official address is ideal over a system of fragmented custom wTAO...
The high upfront cost of creating a subnet can deter many users, stifling innovation on Bit Tensor by favoring those with deep pockets or strong networks. To address this, we propose a lending mechanism where a pool of token holders funds the initial subnet creation fee, recouping their investment over time through a share of the subnet owner’s emissions, as agreed upon for a set period.
